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1.    TWENTY YEARS OF COMPETITION LAW IN ITALY 
Just over twenty years have passed since the Italian Competition Authority (l’Autorità 
Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato – AGCM) was established by the Italian anti-
trust legislation (Law no. 287 dated 10th October 1990). 
Commentators have emphasised how a competition culture that was formerly foreign to 
our legal order, encumbered as it had been by anti-competitive practices for more than half 
a century, has developed in the peninsula during these last two decades.  It has also been 
noted that, in line primarily with European influence but also, to a lesser extent, with that of 
the United States1, the criteria for interpreting the rules on competition have increasingly 
felt the influence of economic analysis. 
It has likewise been observed how a first decade (from 1990 to 2000), with a happy 
experience of competition-fostering policies and independent authorities in Italy, has been 
followed by a second, darker decade (from 2001 to the present day) during which the 
independent authorities’ beneficial role within the legal order has been undermined.  This 
state of affairs has been created mainly by the return of an aggressive form of politics, 
which has emptied competitive practices of their innovative impact from the inside, and by 
an impenetrable wall erected by the courts, which have contained the role of the authorities 
from the outside and influenced the way in which competition is understood in our 
country2. 
                                                 
1
 G. Amato, La legge antitrust venti anni dopo, in Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 
2010, No. 4, 923 et seq. 
2
 S. Cassese, L’Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato nel “sistema” delle 
autorità indipendenti, in Giornale di diritto amministrativo, 2011, No. 1, 102 et seq. 
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In this context, it may be interesting to examine how the Constitutional Court has 
contributed to the debate during the last year and a half with three significant and 
controversial judgements. Through these decisions, the Court has influenced the way 
competition is conceived in our legal order3 (particularly with regard to public services and 
procurement), although it seems to have helped instil new doubts rather than allay already 
existing ones. 
Before examining the orientation of the Constitutional Court’s decisions, however, it is 
necessary to clarify a preliminary point.  In all three cases, the Court had been called to 
adjudicate applications made by the State or one/some of the Regions regarding attribution 
of the legislative competence to protect competition.  In this respect, the reform of Title V 
of Part II of the Constitution effected in 2001 provided for the division of legislative power 
between the State and the Regions as follows:  some expressly listed subject-matters have 
been attributed to the exclusive legislative power of the State (under article 117(2) of the 
Constitution);  other subject-matters (also expressly listed), have become the  object of 
concurrent legislative power (the State establishes the basic principles and the Regions are 
responsible for the detailed legislation:  article 117(3) of the Constitution) and legislative 
power pertaining to the subject-matters not listed lies residually with the Regions (article 
117(4) of the Constitution). 
                                                 
3
 For a reconstruction of the national rules on competition, with particular reference to the 
relationship between competition and public services, see, by way of example from 
amongst the most recent works, A. Police, Tutela della concorrenza e pubblici poteri, 
Giappichelli, Turin, 2007; F. Giglioni, L’accesso al mercato nei servizi di interesse 
generale. Una prospettiva per riconsiderare liberalizzazione e servizi pubblici, Giuffrè, 
Milan, 2008; A. Lalli, Disciplina della concorrenza e diritto amministrativo, Editoriale 
Scientifica, Naples, 2008; F. Cintioli, Concorrenza, istituzioni e servizio pubblico, Giuffrè, 
Milan, 2010, and D. Gallo, I servizi di interesse economico generale. Stato, mercato e 
welfare nel diritto dell’Unione europea, Giuffrè, Milan, 2010. 
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The protection of competition is one of the subject-matters falling within the exclusive 
legislative competence of the State (art. 117(2) of the Constitution), although it is not a 
subject-matter proper but, rather, a legal regime.  As such, it cuts transversally through 
many subject-matters, making the Constitutional Court’s work of interpretation a 
complicated one and ending up creating pockets of exclusive state legislative power even in 
areas apparently falling within the concurrent or residual power of the Regions. 
Not by chance, the number of constitutional disputes regarding the division of 
legislative competence between the State and the Regions has grown exponentially during 
the last few years.  It is fair to say that, at present, the Constitutional Court is principally 
being called to decide issues concerning the boundaries between state and regional 
legislative competence (raised in applications brought directly, challenging legislation). 
 
2.    UNIFORMITY AN „ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTIC“ OF 
COMPETITION 
The Constitutional Court’s first significant ruling is its Judgement no. 283, dated 6th 
November 2009.  Under this ruling, some provisions introduced by the Region of Puglia in 
relation to procurement contracts below the EU threshold were declared to be 
constitutionally unlawful. 
According to the Court, «the entire regulation of public procurement procedures is 
ascribable to the protection of competition, and legislative competence consequently lies 
exclusively with the State».  For such purposes, it is irrelevant whether the contract is 
above or below the threshold or whether the content of the contested provision fosters 
competition.  This, in the Court’s opinion, insofar as the Constitution has provided that it is 
to be exclusively the State that regulates the protection of competition, in order to ensure 
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Unlike the subject-matter of environmental protection (where regional legislative 
interventions providing for a higher level of environmental protection than the State’s are 
permitted), in the case of competition protection «uniformity constitutes a value in itself 
because different regional regulatory provisions are liable to result in regulatory inequalities 
which produce territorial barriers».  In the Court’s opinion, «the protection of competition 
cannot be achieved area by area:  of its very nature, it cannot tolerate territorial 
differentiations that would end up restricting or even neutralising the effects of the rules 
that guarantee it». 
The Constitutional Court has adopted a highly statist position with this ruling.  As has 
been noted, such a position ends up penalising regional regulatory power even in the cases 
where measures fostering competition have been introduced4. 
It is precisely this last point that would seem to constitute the heart of the matter.  
Measures that apparently foster competition can end up creating great hardship to 
undertakings and therefore harm the process through which competition develops.  The 
Court thus seems to have meant to say that whilst, on the one hand, competition law must 
be contextualised within the legal system in which it is applied, on the other, if it is to catch 
on and produce results, undertakings must be able to count on a competition law that is 
particularly “robustly” uniform throughout the national territory. 
On the whole, the criterion thus established by the Court may be viewed favourably but 
it lays itself open to potential criticism (criticism that disregards the object of the Court’s 
decision, however):  precisely on account of the environmental framework, not always are 
all the areas within the national territory “culturally” equipped to sustain the competition-
fostering measures that have been introduced. 
                                                 
4
 E. Carloni, L’uniformità come valore. La Corte oltre la tutela della concorrenza, in Le 
Regioni, 2010, 670 et seq. 
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3.    COMPETITION AND THE „SOCIAL USEFULNESS“ LIMITATION  
The Constitutional Court’s second important ruling is its Judgement no. 270, dated 23rd 
June 2010.  This declared the rules permitting the merger between Alitalia and AirOne, 
undertakings operating in the air transport sector, to be lawful. 
In this case, the Court had been called to evaluate the constitutional legitimacy of a 
decree-law that effectively permitted the merger of Alitalia with AirOne, in derogation 
from the anti-trust law governing mergers.  This was for the purposes of saving Italy’s 
national airline (in crisis) and resulted in a constriction of the freedom of competition. 
The Court reached the conclusion that the “norma-provvedimento”5 was lawful.  It 
considered that, in certain particular circumstances, it is reasonable and proportionate to 
weigh the interests of competition against those of social usefulness:  especially, in this 
case, in the light of sub-clauses (2) and (3) of article 41 of the Constitution, which expressly 
refer to social usefulness and social purposes. 
                                                 
5
 Translator’s note:  the Court used the term “norma-provvedimento” to refer to the specific 
decree-law issued by the Government in this particular case.  The instrument normally used 
in such cases is a “legge-provvedimento”: a law adopted by Parliament that has the form of 
an Act of Parliament (Legge) but the content of an administrative measure (the content is 
not addressed to a general category of citizens but, rather, to one or more specifically 
identified parties: in this case, Alitalia and AirOne).  In the case in point, the peculiarity 
was that the measure relating to Alitalia and AirOne was not adopted by way of a law of 
Parliament’s but by a governmental decree-law (decreto-legge).  Decree-laws are measures 
that have the value of an Act of Parliament but are adopted by the Government in cases of 
urgent necessity.  They have to be converted by Parliament into a “Legge” within 60 days, 
failing which it is as if they had never been adopted. 
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The Court held that article 41 of the Constitution, «by establishing that private 
economic initiatives cannot be conducted contrary to the principle of ‘social usefulness’ or 
in a manner that is harmful to security, freedom or human dignity, and by providing that 
public and private-sector economic activity may be directed and co-ordinated towards 
social ends, permits a form of regulation that also ensures the protection of interests other 
than those pertaining to the protected competitive market».   Such a form of regulation, 
however, is permitted by way of derogation and only in absolutely exceptional cases. 
And, in the Court’s opinion, such a situation existed in the case under examination, 
since the legislator was facing the very serious crisis of a provider of an essential public 
service and had to guarantee the activity’s continuation in a sector of strategic importance 
for the national economy. This also for the purposes of preserving the enterprise’s value 
and averting a serious employment crisis. 
So, «the balancing of a multiplicity of interests imposes a choice that is atypical of anti-
trust investigations but effectively characterised by economic-policy and market-regulation 
connotations that are imposed by an exceptional situation». 
On the basis of such premises, the Court applied the proportionality test to the measure 
adopted by the Government.  It concluded that the contested provision passed the test and 
was constitutionally lawful, partly because the Italian Competition Authority enjoys the 
power to intervene ex post and sanction possible abuses of a dominant position deriving 
from the merger. 
The Constitutional Court’s judgement has delivered a serious blow both to the material 
“economic constitution” and to competition culture, fuelling as it does the State’s dirigiste 
policy of interfering to protect indigenous interests.  As has been noted, the thesis that 
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competition law gives way in the face of other interests gains credit, whilst the statement 
that the competition principle will be extended further appears to remain pure theory. 6  
Indigenous interests that are mainly private, moreover, in relation to which the 
constitutional reference to social usefulness does not appear to have been made in a wholly 
convincing manner.  In short, an unsatisfactory judgement in many respects, not least of 
which the obscure application of the proportionality test, which the Court enunciated but 
did not carry out with sufficient rigour. 
 
4.    COMPETITION AND THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC 
SERVICES 
The third significant judgement issued by the Constitutional Court on the subject of 
competition and public services is Judgement no. 325, dated 3rd November 2010.  This 
ruled that the state measures governing modes of action for entrusting local public services 
(section 23-bis of Decree-Law no. 112, dated 25th June 2008) were lawful. 
The measures provided that:  a) local public services are to be entrusted by way of 
competitive public procurement procedures; b) direct awards to hybrid companies the 
private partner of which is chosen by way of a competitive public procurement procedure 
shall constitute an “ordinary” conferral of the management, on condition that the tender 
competition procedure regards not only the partner’s legal status but also the attribution of 
«specific operational tasks connected to the running of the service» and that the private 
partner is allocated a shareholding of not less than 40%;  c)  direct awards must «be made 
                                                 
6
 L. Stecchetti [L. Prosperetti] e G. Amaretti [G. Amato], Il ventennale dell’antitrust e la 
Corte costituzionale, in Mercato concorrenza regole, 2010, 459 et seq.  
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in observance of the principles of Community law», with the further prerequisite that there 
exist «circumstances that, by virtue of the distinctive economic, social, environmental or 
geomorphological characteristics of the territorial context of reference, do not permit an 
effective and useful recourse to the market», and  d)  direct awards may be made with in-
house forms of management, in observance of the conditions required by Community law, 
after seeking the opinion of the AGCM and with the further prerequisite that there exist 
«exceptional circumstances that, by virtue of the distinctive economic, social, 
environmental and geomorphological characteristics of the territorial context of reference, 
do not permit an effective and useful recourse to the market». Through recourse to 
competitive procedures, the Italian Parliament has thus clearly inclined towards a 
competition-fostering solution, to be applied uniformly throughout the national territory. 
The Constitutional Court’s judgement is long and complex.  
The Court took the relationship between national law and European law as the starting 
point for its reasoning and assessed whether European law has imposed such an advanced 
solution on the national legislator in the context of competition in local services.  The Court 
clarified that the national law is compatible with European law but that it does not 
constitute «an application required by the Community and international law referred to, 
(…) choosing as it does one of the various ways of regulating the subject-matter that the 
legislator could lawfully have adopted without breaching the cited sub-clause (1) of article 
117 of the Constitution».  Thus the Italian legislator could have opted for less advanced 
solutions as far as competition was concerned. 
The judgement analyses the Italian concept of a local public service of economic 
importance and the European concept of services of general economic interest, identifying 
their common profiles and the differences between them. 
Referring to the judgement given by the Court of Justice of the European Union on 21st 
September 1999 in case C-67/96 (Albany International BV), the Italian Constitutional 
Court held that the two concepts comprise the same elements, since in both cases the 
service  «a) is provided through an economic activity (in the form of a public or private 
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undertaking), understood in the broad sense as any activity that consists of offering goods 
or services in a specific market» and «b) provides services considered necessary (i.e. 
directed at achieving objectives that are also “social”) vis à vis an undifferentiated 
universality of citizens, irrespective of their particular circumstances». 
In the Constitutional Court’s opinion, the differences between the two concepts are the 
following. 
In the first place, the Community provisions allow the direct running of a local public 
service in cases where an individual Member State considers that application of the 
competition rules would obstruct a public body’s “particular tasks” (article 106 TFEU), 
censuring state decisions only in cases of manifest error.  The national measures, on the 
other hand, chose to prohibit the direct management of local public services by the local 
body concerned.  Thus the Italian Parliament, in exercise of its discretionary power, chose 
not to make use of a possibility conceded by the European provisions. 
In the second place, the Community provisions allow the service to be entrusted directly 
to hybrid companies that have carried out a public tender competition to select the private 
partner.  They require the partner to be an industrial partner but do not set any minimum or 
maximum levels for the private party’s shareholding.  As currently formulated, however, 
section 23-bis departs from the Community law in the part where, for the purposes of the 
abovementioned direct award, it imposes the further condition that the private partner is to 
be allocated «a stake of not less than 40 per cent».    This has the twofold effect of reducing 
the number of cases where a service is entrusted directly and extending the general 
Community rule requiring awards to third parties by way of public tender competitions.  In 
this case, too, the result is achieved through exercise of the legislator’s discretionary power, 
but in a manner that is compatible with the Community provisions. 
In the third place, the Community provisions permit “in-house” awards but only on 
certain conditions that are to be interpreted restrictively:  the entire share-capital must be 
publicly owned, the awarding authority must exercise the same form of control over the 
awardee as it exercises over its own offices and the awardee must carry out the most 
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important part of the activity for the awarding authority.  This exceptional form of award is 
justified by Community law on the basis that the existence of the abovementioned 
conditions prevents the “in-house” contract effectively constituting a genuine contractual 
relationship between the awarding authority and the awardee, since their effect is to ensure 
that the latter is, in reality, no more than the longa manus of the former.  In addition to the 
three conditions indicated, the Italian measure lays down others that limit the circumstances 
in which recourse to in-house management of a service is permitted.  In this way, the 
possibility of derogating from the Community competition rules governing awards of a 
service by way of public competition is limited even further.  Even the Italian Parliament’s 
derogation option does not result in the national law being incompatible with the European 
law, however, since it favours solutions that foster competition. 
The Court then proceeded to examine whether competence to govern the modes of 
action for entrusting local public services lies with the State or with the Regions.  It held 
that, in the case in point, the competence was an exclusive state competence, pursuant to 
article 117(2) of the Constitution, because such area of intervention falls within the 
“competition protection” category of subject-matter, «considering its structural and 
functional aspects and its direct impact on the market». 
The Court went on to find that the Italian Parliament’s solution (designed to restrict the 
cases of in-house awards even further than the Community law does) was not unreasonable 
or disproportionate, even though it was not required by the Constitution. 
Finally, in the Court’s opinion, «for the national legislator, as for the Community one, 
‘economic importance’ also exists where, in order to overcome the particular difficulties of 
the territorial context of reference and guarantee quality services even to a group of users 
who are disadvantaged in some way, automatic market mechanisms are not enough and it is 
necessary to intervene publicly or provide financing that compensates an operator’s duties 
to provide a public service, provided that it is concretely possible to create a market 
upstream, i.e. a market in which undertakings negotiate with public authorities the supply 
of these services to users».  Thus the thesis that «economic importance exists only on the 
twofold condition that a market for the service actually exists and that the local body 
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decides at its discretion to finance the service with the proceeds deriving from the business 
activity in that market» cannot be confirmed. 
That stated, the Court concluded that, «The determination of the conditions constituting 
economic importance is reserved to the exclusive legislative competence of the State, by 
virtue of the fact that such issue falls within the subject-matter of competition protection». 
On the basis of the arguments set out above, the Constitutional Court held that the state 
legislation was constitutionally lawful.   It also declared the constitutional unlawfulness of 
some regional laws, including one enacted by the Region of Campania which had provided 
for regional competence «to regulate the regional integrated water service as a service 
without economic importance and to establish autonomously both the legal status of the 
parties to be entrusted with the service and the timeframe for expiry of the contracts 
currently in force». 
Through this judgement, the Constitutional Court has applied the rules on competition 
rigorously and extensively and, by adopting an objective test of a service’s economic 
importance7, has considerably reduced the scope for regional legislative intervention in the 
field of local public services.  The competition-fostering solutions adopted by Parliament 
have placed Italy in an extremely advanced position regarding the formulation of 
competition rules for the market in the area of local public services.  They are, however, 
solutions that are perhaps more advanced than the Italian legal order and sociological 
context (in some areas in the South, above all) are currently capable of sustaining, 
impacting as they do, what is more, on the management of services of extreme social 
importance, such as water services. 
 
                                                 
7
  On this point, see V. Cocozza, Una nozione oggettiva di “rilevanza economica” per i 
servizi pubblici locali, shortly to be published in Munus, No. 1, 2011. 
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It has recently been noted how, in the field of local public services, the legislator has 
inclined towards competition measures for the market, rather than concentrating on seeking 
a competitive relevant market8.   On the other hand, such an attempt would have been 
fruitless in many cases, on account of both the history and the nature of local bodies in 
Italy: it is hard to find a relevant market in the majority of the peninsula’s small and 
medium-sized municipalities.  
 
5.   CONCLUSION 
The Constitutional Court’s recent decisions highlight at least two significant 
inconsistencies both in the Italian legislation and in the Court’s own consequential journey 
in interpreting the topic of competition in public services and contracts. 
On the one hand, as far as relations between the State and the Regions are concerned, 
one has the impression that the “protection of competition” parameter has sometimes been 
used to erode the Regions’ legislative powers in economic matters, including in sectors 
(such as local public services) in which it would be natural to think of creating a role of 
primary importance for the regional law-maker.  Thus, in comparison with the considerable 
increase in regional legislative autonomy following the constitutional reforms of 2001, the 
Court has taken a retrograde step.  A step that may be partly justified by the shoddy quality 
of regional legislation during the last few years. 
 
                                                 
8
 F. Merusi, La tormentata vita della concorrenza nei servizi pubblici locali, shortly to be 
published in Munus, No. 2, 2011. 
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On the other hand, in the face of a push towards competition for the market in sectors in 
which it is difficult to identify a relevant market, significant restrictions on competition in 
the market may be noted in sectors in which a substantial relevant market does exist. Thus 
the national regulation of competition appears rhapsodic and inconsistent, being expansive 
in some cases and protectionist and restrictive in others. 
In this sense, if it is true that competition cannot be regulated area by area, it is equally 
true that it cannot be regulated by way of derogations and exceptions.  Not if competition is 
to be taken seriously and is to be capable of producing socially advantageous results. 
 
 
